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Abstract
Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) o¤er an attractive equilibrium concept for an electricity
Pool in which all suppliers receive the market clearing price and are an important tool for
examining market power. It is helpful to have analytical solutions available for simple models
to explore market behaviour and to check computational solutions. This note derives analytic
solutions for the symmetric case of linear and quadratic costs, and where each rm has
an identical set of constant but di¤erent marginal cost technologies, as in most practical
applications to data. Such stepped marginal cost schedules can replicate general marginal
cost schedules to any desired degree of accuracy and hence symmetric SFEs can be solved
analytically by piecing together recursively dened supply functions for general cost functions.
The paper discusses the question of the uniqueness and stability of these symmetric solutions,
but notes that nding asymmetric analytic solutions is generally di¢ cult. It collects together
and extends results scattered in earlier working papers to make them more accessible.
1 Introduction
A Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) is a set of supply functions Si(p) (made up of o¤ers to
supply by rms i, i = 1; 2; :::n; when the price is p) such that each rm maximizes its prot
taking the supply functions of the other rms as given, and is thus a Nash equilibrium in supply
An earlier version of this paper titled Supply function equilibriawas produced in November 2002, but this
version extends those results by nding analytical solutions to step function approximations to general cost func-
tions. Support from the ESRC under the project R000 238563 E¢ cient and sustainable regulation and competition
in network industries, and from Cambridge MIT Insitute under the CMI Electricity Project is gratefully acknowl-
edged. I am indebted to Karsten Neuho¤ who provided crucial mathematical input, and to Pär Holmberg and
Richard Green for their helpful comments.
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functions. It can be found from the prot maximizing behaviour of rm i facing residual demand
Ri(p) = D(p) 
P
j 6=i Sj(p), where D(p) is demand facing the n rms at price p.
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) were interested in the case in which demand was uncertain,
so that o¤ers to supply had to be valid for a range of possible outcomes. Thus if D(p; t) varies
with t, which they took to be states of the world, then p will be a function of that variable,
and the SF is chosen given some probability distribution over t before the state of the world is
realized. Green and Newbery (1992) argued that t could be taken as time during the course of
a day for which o¤ers to supply at varying prices into an electricity Pool were valid. In practice
both electricity demand and supply are subject to random shocks at each moment, so that t
describes both predictable and unpredictable variations over the duration of the o¤ers. This
additional uncertainty, notably the Loss of Load Probability that is the reason for the reserve
margin, contributes a critical determinant of uniqueness (Holmberg, 2005a; 2008).
Supply Function Equilibria o¤er an attractive equilibrium concept for an electricity Pool
in which all suppliers receive the market clearing price, MCP (sometimes termed the system
marginal price, or SMP). They appear to capture aspects of reality, in that the price-cost margin
is low when demand is low relative to available capacity (Bertrand-like behaviour) and high
when demand is high relative to available capacity (Cournot-like behaviour). An SFE is most
simply characterized when supply and demand can be represented as di¤erentiable functions of
price. The prot function for rm i o¤ering a supply function Si(p) and facing a residual demand
function Ri(p) = D(p)  
P
j 6=i Sj(p) when the price is p is i(p; t) = pRi(p)   Ci(Ri(p)) where
Ci(qi) is the cost function when production is qi, or
i(p; t) = p
0@D(p) X
j 6=i
Sj(p)
1A  Ci
0@D(p) X
j 6=i
Sj(p)
1A : (1)
The rst order condition for rm i maximizing prot can be written
Si(p) = (p  C 0ifSi(p)g)(
X
j 6=i
S0j(p) Dp(p; t)); i = 1; 2; :::n: (2)
where derivatives with respect to the dependent variable are marked with a dash, or, in the case
of demand, with subscript p. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) showed that the solutions to this set
of n interdependent di¤erential equations are potentially supply function equilibria.
In addition to these various market relations, there are further conditions needed for fea-
sibility: the solutions must be (weakly) monotonically increasing in price, outputs cannot be
negative, and output must be feasible given capacity constraints. Anderson and Hu (2008) use
the term strongly optimal if the supply function gives the highest achievable prot subject to
constraints on price, capacity, and the other supplies o¤ered, for every realization of demand,
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ruling out cases where the best supply response has a negative slope (and must therefore be
constrained to a constant over an interval whose choice depends on the probability distribution
of demand shocks). They characterise a strong SFE as one in which supply functions are piece-
wise smooth and strongly optimal. Weakly monotonically increasing piecewise smooth supply
functions satisfy these criteria.
The e¤ect of requiring weak monotonicity is most readily appreciated in the case of a sym-
metric n-rm oligopoly with separable demand, D(p; t) = D(p) + "(t), for which (2) can be
written
q(p) = (p  C 0(q))((n  1)dq
dp
 Dp);
(n  1)dq
dp
=
q
p  C 0(q) +Dp; (3)
where Dp  0. For valid solutions 1  dSi (p)=dp = dq=dp  0. If p = C 0(q), then dq=dp = 1
(i.e. dp=dq = 0) and the solution is competitive, while if dq=dp = 0, then q + (p C 0(q))Dp = 0,
which is the Cournot solution. Valid solutions are therefore bounded between the competitive
solution and the Cournot solution, between which there may be a continuum of possible SFE.
This multiplicity of possible equilibria is troubling, and much of the study of SFE has been
concerned to narrow down the set of possible SFEs, preferably to a unique case.
If we consider the more conventional representation with output on the x-axis, then the most
competitive SFE meets the marginal cost schedule (assuming it increases) at its intersection with
maximum demand, where its slope is at: dp=dq = 0, and the least competitive SFE meets the
intersection of maximum demand with the Cournot line at bp with slope there vertical: dp=dq =1.
All valid SFEs lie between these two extreme solutions: C 0(q(p)  p  C 0(q(p)) + q(p)=( Dp)
Figure 1 illustrates this for the case of England and Wales in 1990, as tted in Green and Newbery
(1992). it shows that the range of feasible SFE becomes far smaller as the number of generating
companies increases from two (the chosen structure) to ve (as recommended by Green and
Newbery, and implemented in e.g. Victoria, Australia shortly after).
Newbery (1992a, 1998) shows how capacity constraints can narrow down the range of valid
SFEs, in some cases to a unique solution, as shown in section 2.3. If generators are subject to a
potentially binding price cap p < bp, assumed to be above the maximum value of marginal cost,
then the range of solutions will also be restricted. In short-hand, then, a solution to (1), S,
is a set of supply functions Si (p)  C 0i(Si (p); i = 1; 2; ::n, satisfying (2) for p p  p, with
1  dSi (p)=dp  0, where, if there is no formal price cap, p = bp.
However, there are a number of problems in solving for SFEs. Analytical solutions exist (and
provide useful numerical checks) for the simple case of linear demand, if all rms have the same
constant marginal costs at each level of output, even with varying capacity constraints. These
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Figure 1: Supply functions for a duopoly and quintopoly
have the property that there is normally a continuum of equilibria bounded by a most and least
competitive outcome, though the range can shrink to a unique equilibrium under certain demand
and capacity conditions (Newbery, 1998). Specic a¢ ne solutions (i.e. solutions where o¤ers are
linear in price) can be derived for the case of linear demand and a quadratic cost function, giving
linear marginal costs (Green, 1999; Baldick, Grant and Kahn, 2004). Analytic solutions can also
be derived for the case of symmetrical rms and general cost functions provided the residual
demand elasticity is zero (Rudkevich, 1998). This can be seen by rewriting (3) with Dp = 0 and
multiplying by the integrating factor q1 n to give
dp
dq
=
(n  1)(p  C 0(q))
q
;
d
dq
(q1 np) = (1  n)q nC 0(q);
p = qn 1
Z
(1  n)q nC 0(q)dq: (4)
Thus for the case of a¢ ne (i.e. linear with an intercept) marginal costs, C 0(q) = a+ bq, (4)
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gives
p = qn 1
Z
(1  n)(aq n + bq1 n)dq;
= a+
n  1
n  2bq +Kq
n 1: (5)
The case of inelastic but uncertain demand, with a positive probability that capacity con-
straints will bind, yields unique SFE, as demonstrated by Holmberg (2004) and discussed in 2.3
below.
Newbery (2002) shows that analytical solutions (but in implicit function form) can also be
derived for the symmetric n-rm oligopoly case with linear marginal costs and linear demand, and
these have a similar graphical appearance to the constant marginal cost case. Their derivation
is set out in section 3 below.
2 SFEs with constant marginal costs
Consider the case of n symmetric core strategic rms with constant marginal costs (set at zero
by a choice of the price intercept), facing an demand schedule Q(t) =Max(A(t)   p; 0).1 The
di¤erential equation is given from (3):
(n  1)dq
dp
=
q
p
  : (6)
This is readily integrated to give
q = Kp  p ln p; n = 2; (7)
q = Kp1=(n 1)   p
(n  2) ; n > 2; (8)
where K is a constant of integration. The constant will depend on how competitive the industry
is, and may be determined by entry conditions that drive average prices down to the average cost
of new entrants (Newbery, 1998). The least competitive solution is found by the joint intersection
of the SF with the Cournot line Qc = np and the maximum demand schedule, D = A  p atbp. For example, in the case of n = 3; bp = 14A= and K = 2pbp, so that q = 2pbpp  p.
2.1 Symmetric stepped marginal cost functions
The next step in complexity is to consider a set of n identical rms with a series of generating
sets, each of the same capacity but di¤erent variable costs. These can be numbered in order of
increasing cost, with marginal costs given by C 0(q) = mj , kj  q < kj+1, j = 1; :::N , k1 = 0 = m1
1This could be written in the form A(t)   p by a suitable choice of quantity units, but it will be convenient
later to be able to vary the slope parameter .
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(by choice of the origin of prices), facing demand A p, (i.e. setting  = 1 by a suitable choice of
units). Suppose for the moment that each rm has an unlimited amount of the nal generating
set, numbered N . Suppose that there are n > 2 rms (the case of n = 2 has a di¤erent functional
form (7) but can be solved by the same techniques). The di¤erential equations are given by (3).
Dene y = p mj , and consider a range of supply o¤ers kj  q < kj+1, for which the di¤erential
equation can be written
(n  1)dq
dy
=
q
y
  1; for which the solution is
q = Kj(p mj)1=(n 1)   (p mj)
(n  2) ; kj  q < kj+1: (9)
It remains to select a set of constants Kj such that the supply functions (SFs) that solve
(9) are both feasible and continuous (i.e. are strong equilibria, see Proposition 2 below) at
values (q; p) = (kj+1; pj+1). Feasibility requires that the SFs lie between the Cournot line and
the marginal cost schedule, but now the Cournot line is discontinuous (as in gure 2) and
dened in segments as Qcj = n(p  mj); j = 1; :::N . The constants must be such that there is
a continuous solution threading back between these two boundaries from a suitable end point
boundary condition.2
For example, suppose n = 3, N = 2, so there are two di¤erent types of generation set with
variable costs zero and m, with k2 < 14(A  m) (so that both types will be used) The Cournot
lines are Qc1 = 3p, 0  Qc1  3k2, Qc2 = 3(p   m); 3k2 < Qc2. For existence, the Cournot line
cannot intersect the next step in the marginal cost schedule, so m < k2. One can then check to
see if the least competitive solution for the second segment is feasible for the rst segment. That
is found by the joint intersection of the SF with the Cournot line, and for this to occur when
the marginal cost is m; Qc = 3(p  m); meets the maximum demand schedule, D = A   p atbp = 14A+ 34m. bq = 14(A m), (at B in gure 2) so that
bq = 1
2
K2
p
A m  1
4
(A m) = 1
4
(A m);
K2 =
p
A m:
Then at (k2; p2) q(p2   ")! q(p2 + ") as " # 0, or
k2 = K1
p
p2   p2 = K2
p
p2  m  (p2  m);
K1 =
p
p2 + k2=
p
p2;
2 It is natural to start with the highest possible value and work back as that choice indexes all solutions to
the di¤erential equation, while there are an innite number of solutions that pass through the origin. One could,
however, choose any point bounded away from the local marginal cost to index solutions.
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Supply offers with discrete variable costs
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Figure 2: Supply functions for n = 3;  = 1 = A, m = 0:1; k2 = 19 :
where p2 can be solved in terms of K2 and k2. For example, if A = 1, m = 0:1 < k2 = 19 ,bp = 0:325; then K2 = 0:95, and y = p2   0:1 solves a quadratic giving solution p2 = 0:12,
K1 = 0:67. This is readily seen to be infeasible, as it lies above the rst Cournot line, whose
value at k2 = 0:111 < p2. Instead the least competitive solution meets the rst Cournot line
at (k2; p2) = (k2; k2), (at point A in gure 2) so K1 = 23 . Continuity at (k2; k2) determines
K2 = 1:16, and as gure 2 shows, leads to a SF that is considerably below the infeasible least
competitive second segment SF, reaching maximum demand at point C.
Whilst it is generally di¢ cult to solve for a smoothly continuous general marginal cost
function C(q), except for inelastic demand, in practice most electricity market models assume
constant marginal costs for each type of generation unit (nuclear, coal, gas, gas turbine, etc.),
and so this extension is of considerably practical use, provided that all price-setting generating
companies have the same amount of each type of generating set. Figure 3 gives one of several
marginal cost schedules for the six countries studied in the EU Sector Inquiry, and it demonstrates
that a stepped marginal cost schedule is a better approximation that a smooth curve.
It is possible to solve (2) numerically for the asymmetric case, although with di¢ culty as
the solutions are very sensitive to initial conditions. Fortunately, the solutions for asymmetric
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Figure 3: Merit Order Curve (incl. Carbon) - Spain (London Economics, 2007, p403)
congurations seem to be perturbations from symmetric congurations, so the latter may provide
a reasonable approximation (as Rudkevich, 1998, assumed in his empirical illustration).
2.2 The e¤ect of price caps
If the market is subject to a price cap of p < bp, and if the demand function is again written
as A(t)   p, then the least competitive SFE for the case n = 3 in (8) has K = A 2p
3
p
p
and so
aggregate supply Q = 3q:
Q(p; ) = (A  2p)
p
p=p  3p:
For any value of p, Q is clearly decreasing in , so there is a well-dened sense in which the
least competitive solution is that for which  = 0, and so solving for the case of inelastic demand
provides an upper bound (for prices, given supply) on the range of feasible SFEs. Setting  = 0 in
(8) gives the same solution as (5) for the case a = b = 0.
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2.3 The e¤ect of capacity constraints
Newbery (1992a) solves for the zero marginal cost duopoly with potentially di¤erent capacity
constraints, and that method is readily extended to an n-rm symmetric constant marginal
cost oligopoly. Holmberg (2005a; 2007) provides an exhaustive analysis of the identical constant
marginal cost case with di¤ering capacities, and provides convenient proofs of the more important
propositions. Genc and Reynolds (2004) show that the existence of a pivotal supplier reduces the
set of possible SFE, and Holmberg (2005a) establishes uniqueness with inelastic but uncertain
demand, a positive probability that the capacity constraint will bind, and a price cap, p (to
constrain prices with monopoly and inelastic demand). He also establishes useful propositions
for this special case that justify the way in which solutions to the di¤erential equations are
pieced together, which it is useful to reproduce here. They apply for the case of rms with
identical constant marginal costs, facing inelastic but uncertain demand, a positive probability
that the capacity constraint will bind, and a price cap, p, but apply under a wider range of
conditions. Thus Anderson and Hu (2008) give similar propositions for more general cost and
demand functions for strong supply function equilibria but under the assumption that demand
is su¢ ciently elastic to prevent any price caps binding.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium no capacity is o¤ered below marginal cost or withheld.
Proposition 2 There are no discontinuities in the equilibrium price.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, no rm can have a perfectly elastic supply below the price cap,
and at most one rm can have perfectly elastic supply at the price cap.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, all rms for whom capacity is not constrained in an interval
must have identical SFs on that interval.
Proposition 5 There is no equilibrium in which the SF of a rm is inelastic in an interval
[pL; pU ] where marginal cost c  pL < pU  p unless its capacity constraint is binding.
As a result every rm o¤ers its rst (innitesimal) increment at marginal cost and has price
responsive supply up to full capacity. If demand is price responsive, i.e.  > 0, then it is no
longer necessary to impose a price cap to ensure nite solutions and so, in the absence of a price
cap, there should be no perfectly elastic segments of the SFE.
Consider the deterministic demand case in which there is no risk (zero probability) of loss of
load. If rm i has capacity ki, so that qi  ki, then the solutions (7,8) must be modied to reect
the constraints. As an example, consider the asymmetric capacity case of n = 3, k1 < k2 < k3,
9
with demand schedule Q(t) =Max(A(t)  p; 0). Dene Kj =
Pj
i=1 ki as cumulative capacity of
the rst j rms, and consider solutions for respectively 3, 2, and then only 1 price setting rm(s):
qi = B1
p
p  p; p  p1 = q 11 (k1);
qi = B2p  p ln p; p1  p  p2 = k2=; i = 2; 3;
q1 = k1; p  p1;
q3 = p; q2 = k2; p  p2:
The constants for the least competitive solution are determined by working back from the equi-
librium at maximum demand.
If the intersection of maximum demand with the single rm Cournot line qc = p is at
demand D = A   p greater than K2, then the largest rm will be pivotal, i.e. the single
price-setter, setting the Cournot price, over some range of prices. A su¢ cient condition for a
terminal monopoly is that A  A(t) > k1 + 3k2 = A(t2), for a range of values of t. If that
condition is satised, then the second largest rm must reach full capacity on its Cournot line
qc = p at p2 = k2=; giving the unique value of B2 = (1 + ln(k2=)). Output of rm 2
will be q2 = p(1   ln(p=k2)); which will decrease with price to k1 at price p1; where k1 =
p1(1   ln(p1=k2)) > p1, which has a valid solution p1 < p2, for which B1 = (k1 + p1)=pp1
The result will be a unique piecewise continuous SFE. Multiple SFE require that the largest rm
is never pivotal (i.e. it is possible to meet maximum demand with capacity K2). This can be
summarized in
Proposition 6 In a deterministic market with linear price responsive demand and all rms
having identical constant marginal costs, the SFE is unique if a single rm is pivotal (but never
capacity constrained) for a range of demand levels.
Figure 4 (this time graphing quantities against price rather than the more usual presentation
of price against quantity) illustrates the case for capacities k1 = 0:5; k2 = 0:7; k3 = 0:8;  =
1, A = 2:8; A = 1:5, showing that at minimum demand none of the rms is capacity constrained,
but at peak demand both the smaller rms are capacity constrained, so that the largest rm is
pivotal for a short period, but never reaches full capacity. The restriction that supplies must be
non-decreasing in price binds for rms 1 and 2.
2.4 The e¤ect of contracts and entry
Electricity spot markets are volatile, and both suppliers and consumers wish to hedge risk with
contracts, typically for base-load, peak, or possibly for other sets of hours. The e¤ect of contract-
ing is to add an extra term (f p)xi to prot, where xi is the size of the (base-load) contract sold
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Figure 4: Asymmetrically capacity constrained triopoly
at strike price f . Newbery (1998) shows that the e¤ect of contracting is to reduce the spot market
exposure from qi to qi xi, and the di¤erential equations remain as before if yi = qi xi replaces
qi. Thus all SFEs can be considered as spot market solutions for uncontracted quantities.
If there are xed capacity costs in addition to variable costs, then equilibrium in an electric
supply industry under free entry will determine the maximum sustainable average price, which
will set the price of the base-load contracts, f , while arbitrage will force the average of the spot
prices in a risk-neutral industry down to f . Contracts allow incumbents to commit to delivering
an average price f , possibly after accepting entry or new incumbent investment, and reducing
the range of possible SFE to a unique SFE.
2.5 Piece-wise linear demands and fringe suppliers
Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2004) argue for using piecewise linear supply functions (PWLSFs)
as providing simpler solutions for more complex cases where there is a fringe of competitive
generators and a core of strategic generators. If the fringe has a linear supply function, and
total demand is linear, as before, their presence can be represented by a kinked residual demand
function facing the core producers. They also consider the case in which each rm has quadratic
costs and hence a¢ ne marginal costs, ai + biqi, where each rm may have a di¤erent minimum
cost, ai. Again, the residual demand facing rms can be represented as piecewise linear.
Their argument for using PWLSFs is one of tractability, but it leads to solutions that are
unlikely to be optimal. It seems preferable to attempt to understand the optimal SF given piece-
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wise linear continuous demand schedules. This section therefore starts with the simple case of
constant marginal costs, and then shows how to extend this to the case of a competitive fringe
of suppliers whose collective supply is linear in price up to full capacity. This can be extended to
the case in which each member of the fringe has a possibly di¤erent capacity-constrained linear
supply function leading to a piece-wise linear aggregate fringe supply function.
If aggregate fringe supply is Qf = (   )p, p  p,  > , where full capacity (   )p is
reached at p, so that above that price fringe supply is constant at ( )p, and if total demand
is the non-negative part of A(t) + p  p, then the net demand facing the core oligopoly takes
the quasi-concave piecewise linear form
D(p; t) = Max(A(t)  (p  p); 0); p  p; (10)
= Max(A(t)  (p  p); 0); p > p;
where A(t) 2 [A;A], 0 < A < A. The solutions from (7,8) to each segment of demand can be
stitched together by a suitable choice of the constant. For example, consider the case of n = 3:
q = K
p
p  p; p  p;
q = M
p
p  p; p > p; M = K   (   )
p
p:
These solutions are piecewise continuous, but the Cournot line Qc(p) is discontinuous at p,
reecting the discontinuity of the marginal revenue schedule, and is given by
q = p; Qc = 3p; where  = ; p  p;  = ; p > p:
The Cournot line thus may have either one or two intersections with realizations of the
demand schedule, depending on the value of A(t). If there is only ever a single intersection
with demand for p < p, then all SFEs have p < p, corresponding to a single e¤ective demand
schedule D(p; t) =Max(A(t)   (p   p); 0) from (10). If there is only ever a single intersection
with demand for p > p , then the least competitive SFE will be piecewise continuous with a
discontinuous slope at p, meeting the intersection of maximum demand and the Cournot line
for p > p with dq=dp = 0. If there are two intersections for some values of A(t), then the
candidate for the least competitive solution is the SF that meets the intersection of maximum
demand and the Cournot line for p > p, provided it does not rst cross the Cournot line for
p < p, for beyond that point it would have negative slope and thus not be a valid SFE (at least
for an electricity market). A necessary condition for this is that  < A4p +
1
4 , the intersection
of the maximum demand and the Cournot line for p > p.
Figure 5 shows an example where the Cournot line has two intersections for low levels
of demand, but only one at higher levels of demand, and the least competitive SF meets the
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Figure 5: Triopoly with kinked demand showing unconstrained least competitive SFE
intersection of maximum demand and the Cournot line for p > p without intersecting the
Cournot line for p < p. All other SFEs lie between that and the y-axis (which, with zero
marginal cost, is the line of marginal cost and the most competitive SFE).
If, as in Figure 6, the prospective SF that meets the intersection of maximum demand and
the Cournot line for p > p also crosses the Cournot line at p < p, then it has a section of
(invalid) negative slope and cannot be an SFE. The least competitive SFE meets the intersection
of maximum demand and the Cournot line for p < p; and all SFEs lie between that and the line
of marginal cost (the y-axis). In both cases the value of the constant K for the least competitive
SFE is determined by the intersection of the SFE with the Cournot line at maximum demand.
Lower values of K then trace out more competitive solutions.
Capacity constraints (which di¤er by rm) can also be included (Newbery, 1992a). As each
rm reaches capacity output along its SFE, so the remaining rms compete in an oligopoly of one
fewer rms, until the nal (largest) rm can play the Cournot strategy, all other rms producing
an inexible maximum amount. Again the aggregate SFE will be piecewise continuous with slope
changes at each capacity constraint.
It is straightforward to extend this analysis to the case in which each fringe rm has supply
qfi = Max(Min(i(p  ai); ki); 0);
Sf (p) =
X
i
qfi :
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Figure 6: Triopoly with kinked demand: least competitive SFE constrained by Cournot line
The resulting net demand facing the oligopoly is piecewise continuous with kinks depending on
ai; ki, and the solutions to (6) for each segment can again be pieced together to give piecewise
continuous SFs. As the slopes of successive segments of demand approach each other (in the
example as  ! 0, so M ! K, and the SFs become closer to a continuous curve, suggesting
that quasi-convex demand schedules that are not linear can be approximated by piece-wise linear
demand schedules.
2.6 Solutions with di¤ering marginal costs
The more challenging task is to derive solutions where each rm has di¤ering (but constant)
marginal costs, where the simple normalization of setting marginal costs to zero no longer works.
Thus if we consider a duopoly in which rm i has constant marginal costs of ci; c = c2   c1 > 0,
and if p is dened to be market price less c1; then the SFE is dened by the pair of di¤erential
equations (where demand has negative slope  that can be set either to unity for price-responsive
demand or to zero for the inelastic case):
Dy   z
p  c +  = 0; (11)
Dz   y
p
+  = 0;
where Dy is the rst derivative of y w.r.t. p and where supply of rm 1 is y and supply of rm
2 is z. Di¤erentiate each again to give two second-order linear ordinary di¤erential equations
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(ODEs):
D2y   Dz
p  c +
z
(p  c)2 = 0;
(p  c)D2y +Dy   y
p
=  2;
pD2z  Dy   y
p
= 0;
pD2z  Dz   z
p  c = 0:
If demand is inelastic,  = 0, then the ODEs are homogenous, and in particular have linear
solutions:
y = Max(p; c);
z = Max((p  c); 0):
Baldick and Hogan (2002, section 4.4) show that there are no a¢ ne solutions except for this
special case in which  = 0 and there are only two rms.
It is tempting to see if one can nd simple solutions for the inelastic demand case in which
rms i di¤er in the capacities they have, kij , of a set of di¤erent technologies, such that technology
j has a constant marginal cost mj ; ranked such that mj+1 > mj . The SFs now satisfy
Dy =
z
p  ci ; (12)
Dz =
y
p mi ; (13)
where ci = mj for some j. Di¤erentiate (12) and (13) again
(p  ci)(p mi)D2y + (p mi)Dy   y = 0;
(p  ci)(p mi)D2z + (p  ci)Dz   z = 0:
Consider the piecewise linear solutions:
y = i(p mi); (14)
z = i(p  ci): (15)
Suppose again that m1 = 0, m2 = c, and that rm 1 is the larger rm, with k11 > k21, and
that both rms have unbounded capacities of technology 2. Let a1 = k21 dene the end of the
rst (zero marginal cost) segment, a2 = k11 > a1 the end of the second segment (with di¤ering
costs), and the third (unbounded) segment has both rms with the same costs, c. It is then
straightforward to show that there are no continuous piecewise linear solutions to (14) and (15)
(even if we allow for at segments). Consider possible SFs with y = z = 1p, y; z < a1, y = 1p,
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z = 2(p m), a1 < y; z < a2, y = z = 3(p m), a2 < y; z. Continuity requires (2   1)a1 =
12m, (3   1)a2 = 13m, and 3 = 2, which is impossible if a2 > a1. It therefore appears
that it is not possible to nd piecewise linear SFs for the asymmetric case in which generators have
di¤erent capacities of each technology. It may be that (12) and (13) have non-linear solutions
that could be pieced together to deal with this multiple technology asymmetric case, which would
be very useful in extending the earlier symmetric multiple technology case.
Otherwise the ODEs in (11) may be attacked by Sturm-Liouville theory by writing them in
the form
 D[f(p)Ds(p)] + g(p)s(p) = w(p)s(p);
where s(p) = y(p) or z(p), as above.
3 Quadratic cost functions
Consider the case of a symmetric n-rm oligopoly, each member of which has total costs C(q) =
aq + 12bq
2, and thus a¢ ne marginal costs C 0(q) = a + bq, facing a demand schedule A   p.
Renormalise and dene a new variable y:
y  p  a
b
; or p = a+ by; (16)
then (3) becomes (when Dp =  )
(n  1)dq
dy
=
q
y   q   b: (17)
This has as a linear solution q = y, where
 =
n  2  b +p(n  2)2 + 2nb + b22
2(n  1) < 1: (18)
If  = 0, this takes the simple form q = n 2n 1p, as in (8), and for  small,  is approximately
 =

n  2
n  1

1 +
b
(n  2)2

< 1:
More generally, one can search for linear supply function solutions for the asymmetrical case
with a¢ ne marginal costs (that is, rm i has cost function Ci(qi) = aiqi + 12ciq
2
i , with marginal
costs C 0i = ai+ciqi) and search for supply function solutions Si(p) =Max(i(p i); 0), as shown
by Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2004).
3.1 General analytic solutions
In general we seek analytic solutions which pass through (0; 0) and lie between the p-axis and the
Cournot line Qc = nq = nb1+b y where it meets maximum demand A p = A a by = D(p; t)
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at q; where y is dened by (16). The intersection is where (n + 1 + b)q = A   a (at which
point dq=dy = 1). To make progress, rst substitute u = y   q in (17) to give the di¤erential
equation
du
dy
= K   y
(n  1)u; where K =
n+ b
n  1 :
Substitute u = y=x to giveZ
dy
y
=
Z
n  1
x(n  1  (n+ b)x+ x2)dx =
Z 
1
x
+

x B  
1 + 
x  C

dx
where A and B are the roots of the quadratic equation:
B =
n+ b  p(n+ b)2   4(n  1)
2
< 1;
C =
n+ b +
p
(n+ b)2   4(n  1)
2
> 1;  =
C
B   C :
Note that the term under the square root (n+ b)2 4(n 1) = (n 2)2+2nb+ b22, the term
under the root in (18), so that B = (n  1)(1  ), with  given by (18). As the product of the
roots, BC = n  1, it follows that
C =
1
1   ;
B
C
= (n  1)(1  )2  v < 1: (19)
Equation (17) can now be integrated:
y = K1
x(x B)
(x  C)1+ :
Substituting x and u and simplifying gives
((1  C)y + Cq)1+ = K1((1 B)y +Bq);
y =
C
C   1q +K2(1 B)y +Bq)
C=B =
1

q +K3

q +
1 B
B
y
1=v
; (20)
(substituting for C=(C   1) = 1= from (19)), and a constant of integration K2 or K3 to be
determined by the boundary conditions. This is unfortunately in implicit form. In terms of the
original variables solution (20) can be written as
p  a = bq= +K4 (bq +M(p  a))1=v ; M = 2  ( + n) + n
(1  ( + n) + n) : (21)
The value of K4 can be determined, e.g. for the least competitive solution, which is the inter-
section of the Cournot line qc = b(y   qc) or Qc = nqc = n(p   a)=(1 + b) with maximum
demand A  p at q = (A  a)=(1 + n  b); p   a = (1 + b) q=. If these values of q; p are
substituted into (21) then K4 can be determined as:
K4 =
p   a  bq=
(bq +M(p   a))1=v
:
17
Figure 7: SFEs for the case b = 0:2;  = 1; n = 3; A = 3
Figure 7 plots the solutions to (21) for specic values of the parameters, where the linear
solution is the middle of the ve solutions graphed. Note that the lowest SF becomes infeasible
as it decreases before reaching marginal cost (not shown), and hence would be invalid.
For the special case of inelastic demand,  = 0, B = 1, and again we have p = a+ n 1n 2bq +
Kbqn 1, as before in (5). Moreover, if K3 = 0, this allows the solution q = (p  a)=b as in (5).
Equation (21) can be written as
q(p) = (p  a)=b+K5(q(p) +M(p  a)=b)1=v: (22)
showing that the SFE can be considered as an amplication of the linear solution under inelastic
demand. Again the value of K5 in (22) can be determined for e.g. the least competitive solution
as above.
4 Stepped approximations to general cost functions
It is relatively easy to solve analytically for the stepped marginal cost function, where marginal
costs are constant at mj for step j. As an example, consider approximating the linear marginal
cost function C 0(q) = bq over the range [0; (N + 12)], (where as the number of steps increases, so
 ! 0, and N ! bQ). The marginal cost is mj = jb over ((j   12); (j + 12)], j = 1; 2; :::N , and
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Stepped apprroximation to quadratic cost case
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Figure 8: SFEs for the case b = 0:2,  = 1, n = 3, A = 3
m0 = 0 over [0; 12]. The Cournot line is then Q
c
j = n(p mj) over this interval and the solution
is given by (9). The general solution must be feasible (i.e. lie between the Cournot line and the
marginal cost schedule) and continuous, and over the j-th segment satisfy
q = Kj(p mj)1=(n 1)   (p mj)
(n  2) ; (j  
1
2
) < q  (j + 1
2
);
for suitable constants Kj .
Consider the case n = 3 and suppose at Q = (N + 12), the solution is pN where
q = (N +
1
2
) = KN
p
(pN  Nb)  (pN  Nb);
KN =
p
(pN  Nb) +
(N + 12)p
(pN  Nb)
:
Once KN is determined, the values of Kj can be determined recursively, by noting that at
qj 1 = (j   12) the SF on the j   1-th and j-th intervals are continuous at pj 1, so, letting
pj 1  mj = y,
qj 1 = Kj
p
y   y = Kj 1
p
y + b   (y + b);
0 = y2 + (2qj 1  K2j )y + q2j 1;
Kj 1 =
Kj
p
y + bp
y + b
< Kj ; j = 2; :::; N:
Figure 8 shows the results for  = 0:1, b = 0:2, for two cases, one setting pN = 2, the linear
case demonstrating that indeed if pN = bqN=, where  is dened by (18), then the resulting SF
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is linear, replicating the analytical result for this quadratic cost case. With su¢ ciently small step
lengths the symmetric SFE for any cost function can be solved by similar recursive techniques.
5 Stability analysis
Numerical solutions of the di¤erential equations can in principle be found for the general case
of equation (2), though for asymmetric rms the solutions are notoriously sensitive to the exact
starting solution (Green and Newbery, 1992; Baldick and Hogan, 2001). Recently, Baldick and
Hogan (2006) have raised a number of additional problems that they claim have the e¤ect of
considerably reducing the range of solutions to (2) that are eligible equilibria. Specically, they
cast doubt on whether the full range from least to most competitive solutions meeting all the
required boundary and monotonicity conditions are stable. although this concept of stability
has more to do with out-of-equilibrium behaviour and whether such behaviour will converge to
an equilibrium (and if so to which one) than it has to existence. There are further problems
that arise if there are price caps or discontinuities in the slope of the residual demand schedule
already noted by Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2000) that are ignored in the following discussion.
Baldick and Hogan (2002, section 6) claim that even for the symmetric case with linear
marginal costs and linear residual demand and with no capacity constraints, the range of sta-
ble equilibria is limited to a considerably lower set than that delimited by the most and least
competitive solutions to (2). This is surprising, as Green and Newbery examined this case and
showed that solutions to (2) that lie within this range also satisfy the second-order condition for
prots to be maximized, not at a local minimum or point of inection. At equilibrium, then,
each rm is maximising its prots given the actions of others and has no reason to deviate. The
reason that Baldick and Hogan claim many solutions are unstable has to do with the nature of
perturbations. The normal interpretation of stability of a solution would seem to mean that if
other rms continue to supply along the solution path S i, then any deviation by i from S

i (p)
would be unprotable and hence would be corrected as soon as possible. Nevertheless, out of
equilibrium behaviour and its stability depends sensitively on speeds of response and the decision
variable (e.g. price or quantity) that is adjusted - there are cobweb models that are stable or
unstable depending on the slopes of demand and marginal cost and whether responses are lagged
one or more periods (see e.g. Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981).
Baldick and Hogan adopt a specic concept of, and test for, stability. They consider a
particular form of deviation from a solution S in which all other rms follow S up to price p",
and thereafter each rm j follows a linear extrapolation (or a¢ ne supply function, ASF) from
Sj (p
"), whose slope j at p
" is the slope of dSj (p)=dp at p
". This has the attraction that the
best response to an ASF of arbitrary slope is an ASF with a slope that is a function of the slopes
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j . They then show that if the solution S
 is concave (and hence above the unique ASF that
is an SFE, that we may therefore term the ASFE) then the best response to the ASF deviation
is an ASF that is more deviant than the original deviant ASFs. In other words, any deviation
to an ASF sets in train a response of increasing deviations to ASFs, that will, under reasonably
conditions, converge on the ASFE (assuming also that the point of deviation can gradually move
back towards the zero output point).
This result is not surprising, given two already known results. The rst is that there is a
unique ASFE, so any ASF that is not the ASFE will not be an equilibrium. The second is that
the best ASF response to an arbitrary set of ASFs is closer to the ASFE. Together these imply
that the best ASF response to an ASF lies between that ASF and the ASFE, and in this case
outside the range of the ASF and the original solution set S.
I would argue that this does not demonstrate the general instability of SF solutions, S, ex-
cept for a particular form of disequilibrium dynamics. There are several objections, but consider
the following. The worst case is a duopoly, for then the rest of the industry consists of just one
rm, so one can reasonably accept that all other rms make the same deviation. Much will then
depend on the nature of the deviation, of which there are uncountably many (as there are many
ways to specify cobweb behaviour, for example). Suppose the other rm deviates to a candidate
SF 2 S (which makes some sense) and our original rm is already on an SF in S. Given that
the second-order conditions are satised, we have an apparent puzzle. Each rm would earn
higher prots moving to the SF chosen by his rival, but one of these SFs has higher prots than
the other (at least in the short run if there is no threat of entry and no existing contracts). Log-
ically, they should coordinate on the higher joint prot SF (which will involve higher o¤er prices
for each level of supply), so the deviation might be a signal to coordinate on a more collusive
equilibrium. In that case they would typically move in the opposite direction to that suggested
by Baldick and Hogans analysis. If, on the other hand, there are compelling reasons to select a
less collusive equilibrium SF (because of the threat of entry, or of damaging regulatory scrutiny),
then a determined rm adhering to the lower SF (i.e. lower prices o¤ered for each output) could
make it more protable for the one o¤ering a higher SF to deviate downwards, once it became
clear that the rm o¤ering the lower SF were determined to stick with that.
If there are more than two rms, and they are currently selecting the same SF that lies
above the (equilibrium) ASFE, and one rm deviates to (and remains with) a new SF, then
matters are more complex, as for each other rm, their SF is no longer an equilibrium given the
new residual demand facing them. One can imagine an iterative process in which each of the
other rms selects a new SF from the set S that is a weighted average of the original SF and
that of the deviant. (An argument, which it may be possible to make rigorous, is that the slope
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of the SF o¤ered is a function of the residual demand slope, which will in turn involve sums over
the slopes of the other SFs o¤ered, and these will be a¤ected monotonically.) It is possible that
if the original deviant continues to o¤er the same (new) SF, that eventually all other rms will
converge on that SF, and a new SFE will have been reached. That will presumably depend on
the beliefs of the rms about the desirability of coordinating on a higher or lower SF, as in the
duopoly case.
It is also possible to imagine that rms will adopt punishment strategies for deviations that
reduce their prots (and that are not justied by entry deterrence or other intelligent responses
to changed circumstances). One such would be to select the lowest prot SF from the set S for
a given number of periods. The problem with this argument is that punishments are normally
selected to deter deviations that are individually rational but collectively prot reducing, and the
second-order conditions mean that any individual deviation while all other rms stick to their
original SFs would be individually prot reducing. There is a sense in which the concept of an
SFE already contains its own punishment strategy.
What might go wrong with these arguments? We know from earlier cobweb models that
iteratively responding to earlier price signals may or may not lead to convergence to the full
equilibrium, depending on the relative slopes of supply and demand. We also know that learning
models in which agents respond to price information that partially reveals information about cost
and demand conditions may or may not converge to the full information equilibrium. Clearly in
the electricity spot market although cost and (the distribution of residual) demand conditions
may be common knowledge, the contracting position and hence optimal bidding strategy of other
players will not be known, so learning models are relevant. They are somewhat pessimistic about
convergence.
Baldick and Hogan have, however, noted the considerable di¢ culty in integrating the di¤er-
ential equations dening SFEs, and are anxious to propose an implementable method for selecting
stable candidate SFEs. Their method would seem to restrict choices to the set of SFEs that are
more competitive than the ASFE, for the function space over which they iterate is made up of
piece-wise linear non-decreasing functions with uniformly distributed break points (Baldick and
Hogan, 2001, section 8.2). If their argument that any SF above the ASFE is unstable to devia-
tions to linear SFs applies, then they should not nd any stable piece-wise linear SFs (PWLSF)
above the ASFE. Apparently they do nd some apparently stable PWLSF equilibria, perhaps
because the deviations considered are by a single rm, with all other rms remaining on the
previous candidate PWLSF. Note that the previous stability argument assumed that all other
rms deviated (in a PWL fashion) from a candidate continuously di¤erentiable SFE. Whether or
not their algorithm will identify all the continuously di¤erentiable SFs must be doubtful, and it
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would therefore be dangerous to assume that, for example, the SFE is actually more competitive
than earlier work suggested, as less competitive candidate SFEs are unstable. All they will have
demonstrated is that in some class of deviations and approximated PWLSFs, the set of feasible
solutions is more limited than may have been predicted.
Recently several alternative solution strategies have been proposed to overcome the com-
putational di¢ culties of nding numerical solutions. Holmberg (2005b) and Anderson and Hu
(2008) propose di¤erent numerical algorithms to solve for SFE of markets with asymmetric rms
and general cost functions, removing one argument for concentrating on linear solutions. More
recently, Holmberg, Newbery and Ralph (2008) show that stepped supply function equilibria
converge to continuous SFE as the number of steps increases, suggesting a possible discrete
approximation method to nding solutions to continuous SFE.
6 Conclusions
Continuous supply functions are appealing representations of bidding behaviour in electricity
pools and power exchanges, even where bids and o¤ers are required to take the form of steps or
price ladders (as Holmberg, Newbery and Ralph, 2008, demonstrate). Just as in standard Indus-
trial Organization theory it is useful to have simple analytical models of imperfect competition
(e.g. linear or quadratic cost functions under Cournot oligopoly) to explore market equilibria,
so it is useful to have analytically tractable counterparts for the more complex supply function
models of electricity markets. The aim of this paper was to derive solutions for the cases of
symmetric linear or quadratic cost functions, and also to show that the quadratic cost case is
qualitatively quite similar in general form to the simpler constant marginal cost case. It is also
straightforward to solve the case of linear demand and identical oligopolists, each of which has
the same portfolio of plants with di¤ering but constant marginal costs. Such stepped marginal
cost schedules are standard in modelling the electricity supply industry. In that sense if one
is willing to accept symmetry, it is not necessary to use more complex smooth marginal cost
schedules to approximate the underlying set of di¤erent technologies, and it is still possible to
nd analytical solutions, extending Rudkevichs (1998) approach to the case of price-sensitive
demand.
However, whereas I-O economists can readily solve for static Cournot equilibria with dif-
fering marginal costs, it is in general very di¢ cult to derive analytical solutions for SFE with
di¤ering marginal costs, unless all the asymmetries are conned to the competitive fringe or
price-unresponsive suppliers (such as hydro or nuclear plant), which can be subtracted from
aggregate demand to give a net demand facing the (symmetric) oligopolists.
Whether or not these equilibria are stable depends on out-of-equilibrium behaviour, and,
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contra Baldick and Hogan (2006), there are no good reasons for thinking that all but a¢ ne
solutions are unstable.
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